Our pride and greatness: The Mukti Bahini in 1971

Bangladesh has a place with a select gathering of nations that battled their approach to freedom. We won our opportunity by winning a furious nine-month Liberation War against an all around prepared, very much equipped Pakistan Army. We recall with seriousness and appreciation the penance of the great many our kin who accomplished affliction, who were attacked, mistreated and assaulted by the occupation armed force and needed to escape their homes during the war. The involving Pakistani Army abused us since they needed us to give up to them. All things being equal, the Pakistani Army's 93,000 fighters set out their arms on December 16, 1971, in probably the biggest acquiescence ever. On that day, Bangabandhu's Declaration of Independence of Bangladesh on March 26, 1971, turned into a reality. 

In the 1971 Liberation War, we were victors, not just casualties. Close by honoring our kin's gigantic penance, we should likewise similarly commend the pride and wonder of our Mukti Bahini—the Bangladesh freedom armed force—in accomplishing triumph and making autonomy a reality. 

To state this isn't to lessen the commitment of the Indian military's driving function in accomplishing triumph, for which we will consistently be obliged. It is, all things being equal, to feature the basic job that the Mukti Bahini played. The Mukti Bahini's triumph with the guide of associated Indian powers in December 1971 was exactly practically equivalent to the American Revolutionary Army's triumph over the British Army in October 1783, helped by their partners, the French Army and Navy. 

Two pivotal undertakings anticipate. To begin with, we should implant the tales of boldness of our Mukti Bahini in our public cognizance, telling our youngsters how they battled tirelessly in the nine months before the Indian Army joined the fight to frame the Allied Forces and together annihilation the Pakistan armed force. Our school educational plans, history books, films and theaters need to recount accounts of their colossal demonstrations of mental fortitude, valor and devotion during the war. Second, we need to arrive at a more significant enthusiasm for the essential pretended by the Mukti Bahini in accomplishing triumph. They were not simply assistants as portrayed in a few Indian records, and as even a few Bangladeshis accept. In nine months of war, the Mukti Bahini's assaults methodicallly decimated the Pakistani Army's confidence and supply courses and confined their portability. That, and just that, empowered the Allied Forces' lightning effort, triumph and freedom. 

As a student in Chattogram in 1971, I saw and heard the Bangladesh Liberation War's first fights in the entirety of their power. On the night of March 27, 1971, I saw, with stunningness, Bangladeshi soldiers—at that point East Pakistan Rifles—setting up positions and automatic weapon nets on the Railway slope. I felt lowered realizing that they were preparing to battle and bite the dust for Bangladesh. Afterward, perusing the journals of a Pakistani Special Services Group Commander (Brig ZA Khan, The Way It Was), I understood that those warriors and their confidants in Halisahar cleared out two organizations of Pakistan's second Commandos that had traveled to strengthen Chattogram. 

The Pakistan Army needed to battle through Chattogram, neighborhood by neighborhood, to assume control over the city. In late March, we saw shells shot from PNS Jahangir on Bangladeshi fighters opposing the Pakistan armed force's development and Pakistani Air Force jets doing air attacks to close down Bangladesh's first free radio broadcast at Kalurghat. The Pakistani setbacks in these March fights were various to such an extent that when they arrived at Dhaka, it caused far reaching stun. After that point, to try not to cripple their officers, the Pakistani military arranged that fallen troopers' bodies not be gotten back to Dhaka. 

Through the nine months, Mukti Bahini guerrillas kept persistent weight around evening time through assaults on electrical cables, substations, structures and different targets. On August 15, Chattogram's ground shook from the detonating limpet mines laid by Bangladeshi maritime commandoes sinking Pakistani boats. In December, Chattogram's earth and the sky got intertwined by the haze of thick smoke of the besieged petroleum treatment facilities. The besieging of the Chattogram petroleum treatment facilities was a brave demonstration by Flight Lieutenant Alam and Captain Akram of the new Bangladesh Air Force, who flew a solitary motor Otter plane embracing the ground to keep away from radar to make this challenging assault. 

What occurred in Chattogram happened everywhere on the nation. Subsequent to refocusing and preparing in India and the start of the storms, in excess of 70,000 Mukti Bahini warriors, guerrillas, and mariners in waterway gunboats began ceaseless assaults on the Pakistani Army. These assaults occurred in the outskirt zones as well as in the inside. Tiger Siddiqui's powers in Dhaka's North and the Toha group of the East Pakistan Communists in the South battled steadfastly from bases inside the nation. 

The Mukti Bahini's assaults over the nine months decimated or harmed 231 extensions—including the crucial rail connect close to Feni interfacing Dhaka and Chattogram—and 122 railroad lines, disturbing the Pakistan armed force's stockpile lines and versatility. Inward Pakistani Army briefings by June 1971 portrayed the war viewpoint as an impasse: they would hold the towns while the Mukti Bahini would control the open country. 

Indeed, even that evaluation end up being too hopeful as the Mukti Bahini began assaulting in urban communities and towns. Bomb blasts inside and around conspicuous structures, for example, the DIT, Hotel Intercontinental, government workplaces, and programmed gunfire turned out to be important for Dhaka and Chattogram nights. Towns would dive into murkiness as guerrillas exploded 90 force substations and transmission towers. Armed force jeeps with mounted automatic rifles and Army jeep watches turned into a recognizable sight. As we probably am aware from the splendid record of Jahanara Imam in Ekatturer Dinguli, Pakistani troopers were undependable inside the city as the Crack Platoon could audaciously assault them. 

One of the main assaults occurred in Dhaka on June 6, when Governor Tikka Khan was facilitating a supper for a meeting powerful World Bank mission that had come to assess the circumstance. Exactly when the Governor and his officials were putting forth the defense that regular daily existence had continued, the Mukti Bahini dispatched facilitated assaults around the Government House. As Hassan Zaheer, later Pakistan's Cabinet Secretary, writes in his journals, "bomb blasts and automatic weapon shoot at ordinary spans overwhelmed any endeavor by Pakistani government authorities to convince the meeting mission that things were typical." 

By November, the Pakistani Army had been battled to a halt with gigantic setbacks: 237 officials and in excess of 3,695 warriors had been murdered or injured by Mukti Bahini assaults. The discouragement of the Pakistani Army was almost finished, as obvious from the accompanying anguished section from The Pakistan Army 1966-71, composed by General Shaukat Riza: "[Pakistani] troops confronting the foe one way wound up defeated, their back hindered. Troops moving starting with one position then onto the next got muddled and afterward experienced antagonistic fire when they anticipated agreeable help. By November 1971 a large portion of our soldiers had… battled for a very long time… in an absolutely unfriendly climate. For a very long time they had proceeded onward streets, by day and night, deficiently ensured against mines and everlastingly helpless against snare… By November 1971, the majority of the soldiers had been living in waterlogged dugouts, their feet decayed by sludge, the skins assaulted by vermin, their brains obstructed by an immense clash." 

Anyway, was the Mukti Bahini just another unified unit of the Indian Army, or did they assume a basic part in the Pakistan Army's annihilation? The proof is convincing. The Mukti Bahini's commitment to triumph was deliberately conclusive in at any rate five different ways: first, their assaults broke the Pakistan Army's confidence, as the past passage makes bounteously understood. Second, the Mukti Bahini constrained the Pakistanis to debilitate their situations by spreading their powers meagerly over the nation. Third and fourth, they to a great extent limited the Pakistanis to their bases, without dependable stock lines. At last, they made the Pakistani armed force visually impaired, without that basic element for combat zone achievement: data about the thing was going on around them. In his book Surrender at Dhaka, General Jacobs, at that point Indian Army's Chief of Staff in the East, perceives a portion of these components regardless of whether in passing. 

The supplication here is that throughout the following not many months, as we approach the 50th commemoration of our Independence and Victory Day, we dispatch a public mission to recount anecdotes about the wonder of the Mukti Bahini and arrive at a public enthusiasm for the deliberately unequivocal part of the Mukti Bahini. To put forth this attempt imaginative and academic, let the Liberation War Museum start to lead the pack in this mission with the public authority's help. The Liberation War Museum's fearless endeavors have gathered numerous displays and relics, however most likely the Museum acknowledges that accounts by antiquarians actually anticipate. Quite a public mission should rapidly develop a library of oral chronicles of our political dissidents and authorities. They ought to likewise draw on magnificent books by General Shafiullah, Major Rafiq, Captain (Retired) A Qayyum Khan, and not least the 12 volume Liberation War Documents. These sources give an abundance of strategic level data. At long last, we have the splendid book by Muyeedul Hassan, Muldhara Ekattor, that gives the most insightful and educated record regarding the Mujibnagar Government's chronicled administration in 1971. We should draw on that book both as a source and for instance. Let what Muyeedul Islam's book has accomplished for the Mujibnagar government be accomplished for the Mukti Bahini.